Risk aversion and the gender gap in the vote for populist radical right parties

Odelia Oshri (corresponding author)
Department of Political Science and European Forum
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Odelia.oshri@mail.huji.ac.il
ORCID 0000-0003-1907-8257

Liran Harsgor
Division of Government and Political Theory
School of Political Science
University of Haifa
lharsgor@poli.haifa.ac.il
ORCID 0000-0003-2701-4990

Reut Itzkovitch-Malka
Department of Sociology, Political Science and Communication
The Open University of Israel
reutim@openu.ac.il
ORCID 0000-0002-8058-6237

Or Tuttnauer
Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung
University of Mannheim
or.tuttnauer@mzes.uni-mannheim.de
ORCID 0000-0001-7338-3717

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Abstract

Previous research has established that men are more likely to vote for populist radical right parties (PRRPs) than women. This article shows how cross-national and temporal variations in PRRPs' electoral success interact with individuals' risk propensity to affect this gender gap. We hypothesize that gender differences in the electoral support of PRRPs stem from disparities in risk-taking. We conceptualize risk in terms of two components, social and electoral, and demonstrate that women are more risk-averse regarding both. Our analysis is based on public opinion data from 14 countries (2002–2016) combined with macro-level data on PRRPs' past parliamentary fortunes. To distinguish between the social and the electoral component in risk-taking, we use the illustrative case study of Germany. Findings demonstrate that gender differences in risk-taking and, by implication, the differences between women's and men's responses to the electoral context, are key to understanding the voting gender gap.

Verification Materials

The data and materials required to verify the computational reproducibility of the results, procedures and analyses in this article are available on the *American Journal of Political Science Dataverse* within the Harvard Dataverse Network, at: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/BTE2BK

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Introduction

Populist radical right parties (PRRPs) in Western democracies have consistently garnered more electoral support from men than from women (Akkerman and Hagelund 2007; Givens 2004, 2005). This gap has been described as "a complex and intriguing puzzle" (Betz 1994, 146) since no comparably consistent gender differences have emerged regarding immigration and minority-integration policies, which are pivotal in the PRRPs' electoral campaigning (Harteveld and Ivarsfalten 2018).

Several studies have explored the gender gap in the support for PRRPs and the above puzzle related to it (e.g., Gidengil et al. 2005; Givens 2004; Spierings and Zaslove 2015). However, to the best of our knowledge, no research into this subject has systematically factored in the electoral context and its effects on vote choices of men and women as possible elements that elucidate the wider picture. This article joins a growing group of scholars in arguing that the electoral success of PRRPs can be explained based on the interplay of demand- and supply-side factors (Van Kessel 2015). Regarding the electoral gender gap, we contend that the explanation does not lie solely in voters' characteristics, but that it also involves party-specific qualities and voters' perceptions of, and responses to them. Namely, we focus on PRRPs' past electoral fortunes (or lack thereof) as criteria for risk assessment on the part of voters in choosing a party. We contend that the decision to vote for a PRRP is contingent on an individual's propensity for risk-taking, which is known to be gendered. Following this rationale, we show how demand and supply factors interact and translate differently to the electoral behavior of men and women.

We propose a theoretical framework to explain the observed difference in the electoral support for PRRPs among men versus women, and then apply it to a large sample of voters. We maintain that, for an individual, voting for a PRRP is fraught with a certain degree of risk. Not

only are these parties comparatively unknown entities with limited parliamentary experience at best, but they also challenge the certainties of the existing political order (Steenbergen and Siczek 2017). Consequently, we expect that risk-averse voters will shun them during elections. We establish that women are more risk-averse than men on two dimensions. First, when political behavior is concerned, women tend more than men to avoid voting for parties that have no chance of winning seats in parliament, in case in point, many of the PRRPs; and second, in regard of socially acceptable behavior, women are less prone than men to translate their extreme ideological positions to vote choice.

That said, we argue that the risk of voting for PRRPs varies depending on the electoral context. When PRRPs' prospects to (re)enter parliament are high, the decision to vote for these parties is less risky, both electorally and socially: electorally, because in such circumstances, voting for these parties would not be tantamount to wasting one's vote; socially, because when a PRRP has previously been supported by a large enough portion of the electorate, it can be perceived as a normative political player. Therefore, it stands to reason that the differentiated effect of risk propensity, both electoral and social, on the vote of men and women should manifest more strongly specifically in risky situations, when PRRPs are marginalized.

To test our arguments, we use data from the European Social Survey (2002–2016) in a set of 14 democracies, combined with electoral data on past achievements of PRRPs. Based on individual-level analysis, we find that women's ideological positions and risk-taking propensities are different from men's and that both these tendencies translate to a disparity in their vote choices. Moreover, to the extent that women are more sensitive to risk than men, this differentiated effect is augmented in what we will term here a "risky political context," i.e., a situation when voting for PRRPs entails the risk of "wasting" one's vote. Next, we differentiate between the two

explanations proposed here for the gender gap in voting for PRRPs – i.e., women's propensity for risk aversion, both social and electoral – which may be observationally equivalent in a comparative context. To this end, we use the possibility afforded by the German electoral system to cast two separate votes, one for a candidate and the other for a party-list, as a tool to distinguish between electoral and social risk.

Overall, findings from the cross-national analysis and the German case study fully align with our theoretical expectations. Women's proneness to avoid risk is manifested not only in their ideological positions and reported risk-taking propensities but also in their sensitivity to the risks presented by a given political context. These findings highlight important interrelations between individual characteristics and the party-specific political supply-side, and carry far-reaching implications for the study of the fluctuations in the popularity of PRRPs in Western democracies.

1. The gender gap in voting for PRRPs: Existing explanations

Empirical studies have repeatedly demonstrated that PRRPs have a larger male constituency (Akkerman and Hagelund 2007; Givens 2004, 2005; Spierings and Zaslove 2015; Van der Brug and Fennema 2007) but have diverged in their accounts of this finding. One set of explanations focuses on gender differences in preferences and attitudes, which are supposed to lead women to vote for other parties. Harteveld and Ivarsflaten (2018) found that women are more motivated than men to control prejudice and therefore refrain from voting for PRRPs, which often resort to extremist or even fascist rhetoric and thus raise normative concerns about discrimination and prejudice. Other explanations revolve around gender differences in personality traits and populist attitudes. Thus, Coffé (2019) shows that masculine personality traits are positively correlated with

voting for PRRPs, while Spierings and Zaslove (2017) make a case for the salience of populist attitudes in this respect.

Another line of inquiry attributes the gap to men's and women's different structural positions in the labor market. According to this account, the anti-immigrant sentiment of PRRPs is framed to appeal to those harmed by globalization, usually blue-collar male workers whose jobs have been jeopardized by the influx of immigrant laborers (Betz 1994; Givens 2004; Norris 2005).

Yet another explanation for the gender gap appeals to the anti-feminist agenda promoted by many of the PRRPs. Most of these parties hold a traditional view of women's roles and the family model, and many are characterized by a hierarchical and male-dominated structure (Mudde 2019). This account, however, had not been borne out empirically and was therefore discarded. Specifically, Spierings and Zaslove (2015), as well as De Koster et al. (2014), show that neither gender-role attitudes nor moral progressiveness has much to do with either voting for PRRPs or the attendant gender gap.

Recent studies have suggested that the dynamics of PRRPs' electoral success and of the gender gap therein are contingent on the interaction between the demand- and supply-side factors. An examination of these aspects, the argument goes, would supplement the existing explanations and afford a comprehensive understanding of the political picture (Van Kessel 2015). Some studies (Spierings and Zaslove 2017; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2015) have addressed supply-side differences across countries at the system level. Spierings et al. (2017) extend this approach by modeling macro-level factors indicative of the supply of PRRPs and show that the likelihood of voting for PRRPs depends on the specific characteristics of a party and the presence of other right-

wing parties in the arena. Apart from this work, supply-side explanations for the gender gap in voting for PRRPs have not yet been rigorously modeled systematically or statistically.

Nevertheless, Spierings et al.'s work (2017) bolsters our case that supply involves more than party positions. Therefore, when examining the supply-side, it is crucial to incorporate other factors, in case in point, the electoral context. Accordingly, we account for the gender gap through a combination of demand-side factors, pertaining to trait differences between the sexes, and supply-side parameters, anchored in the electoral context in which PRRPs compete.*1*

Building on the existing literature, this paper advances a novel explanation for the gender gap in electoral support for PRRPs. Our argument is based on the well-established gender differences in risk propensity, which we bring to bear on the electoral arena. The model we set forth here predicts that the gender gap in the vote for PRRPs will be attenuated in the wake of a mainstreaming of the populist radical right, a process which is currently underway in Western countries.

2. Gender differences in risk-taking, risk aversion and risk perception

Our argument hinges on the notion that, under certain conditions, voting for a PRRP can present a risk. Risk is commonly predicated of situations in which individuals must make decisions or choices involving different alternatives with uncertain future consequences (Schubert 2006, 706). The act of *risk-taking*, i.e., making a risky choice, involves two components, *risk tolerance* (risk aversion or acceptance)

1 While the focus here is on PRRPs' electoral histories, this element is only part of the electoral context, which encompasses other party-related parameters, e.g., its "newness" or its perceived ideological extremity.

and *risk perception* (the subjective assessment of risk). In what follows we elaborate on these three constructs and their links to gender.

Numerous studies have established robust gender differences in risk-taking behaviors, with women generally taking fewer risks than men. The idea that men are more likely to take risks than women is supported by a meta-analysis of 150 studies in psychology specifically addressing gender gaps in risk-taking tendencies (Byrnes, Miller, and Schafer 1999). Studies in economics, ranging from lab experiments to field observations, report similar conclusions (Eckel and Grossman 2008; Sunden and Surette 1998). Gender differences in risk-taking behaviors can be attributed to differences in risk aversion, risk perception, or both.

Risk aversion (or its flipside, *risk acceptance*) is often conceptualized as a personality trait and as such, interfaces with other related "Big Five" traits such as Extroversion and Openness (Kam 2012). Risk aversion is contingent on an individual's tendency toward sensation-seeking, which is "a trait defined by the seeking of varied, novel, complex, and intense sensations and experiences, and the willingness to take physical, social, legal, and financial risks for the sake of such experience" (Zuckerman 1994, 27). As a personality trait, risk aversion is conceived of as a stable predisposition and is not issue- or case-specific (Nicholson et al. 2005; Weinstein and Martin 1969).

Women have been shown to be generally more risk-averse than men. Evidence to that effect comes from a variety of fields, including psychology and economics. Kam (2012), for example, documented gender differences in risk attitudes based on a large battery of survey questions. Wilson and Daly (1985, 61) went so far as to describe the trait of risk tolerance as "an attribute of the masculine psychology."

Risk perception is the subjective judgement that people make about the characteristics and severity of a risk. Extant literature grounds risk perception in two psychological models. The risk-and-return model assumes that individuals weigh the perceived returns (or benefits) of a given action against its perceived risks (or costs) and are open to a trade-off between those costs and benefits (Kam 2012). The risk-as-feelings model (e.g., Slovic and Peters 2006; Slovic 2010) frames risk perception as highly dependent on the way individuals intuit a situation.

Studies of risk perception have overwhelmingly found that men seem to be less concerned about hazards than women (Slovic 2010). Based on 25 hazard studies, Flynn et al. (1994) have shown that men perceived risks to be smaller than did women. Some studies suggest that gender differences in risk-taking are based on emotional reactions to risky situations. While women tend to focus on the negative side of a risky situation's outcome distribution and perceive such a scenario as a threat, men often interpret risky situations as challenges requiring their involvement (Arch 1993; Ehrlich and Maestas 2010; Steenbergen and Siczek 2017).

3. The gendered implications of a risk associated with voting for a PRRP

Previous studies have established a relationship between voters' tendencies in perceiving and tolerating risk and their political choices and behavior (e.g., Eckles and Schaffner 2011; Ehrlich and Maestas 2010; Kam 2012; Kam and Simas 2010; Nadeau, Martin, and Blais 1999). Some studies have argued that one's risk aversion affects one's vote choice because voting is regarded as a gamble (Kam and Simas 2012, 747). More specifically, findings show that risk-averse voters are less likely to support challenger candidates over incumbents (Eckles et al. 2014; Kam and Simas 2012), opposition parties over governing parties (Morgenstern and Zechmeister 2001), and change over the status-quo (Morisi 2018; Steenbergen and Siczek 2017).

Based on the above research, we develop a theory that connects gender differences in risk-taking with the gender gap associated with voting for PRRPs. We argue that voting for PRRPs is a risky behavior, both electorally and socially, and therefore one's decision to vote for these parties is governed, to a large extent, by one's levels of risk aversion. We further elaborate how risk aversion will be mostly manifested in risky electoral contexts, such that women will perceive such a situation as riskier than men and will behave (vote) accordingly.

3.1 Electoral risk in voting for PRRPs

Voters may construe voting for PRRPs as electorally risky for two main reasons. First, PRRPs are usually challenger parties with little parliamentary experience relative to other party families. Not all of them have gained parliamentary representation, and the conduct of most of those that have done so is rather unpredictable (Steenbergen and Siczek 2017). Moreover, PRRPs question the status quo and campaign against the political establishment – an agenda that some voters undoubtedly find appealing, but others may consider as risky. Thus, the risk that PRRPs pose on account of their conduct, goals and priorities may deter risk-averse voters, who are usually inclined to avoid challenger and inexperienced parties or candidates (Eckles et al. 2014; Kam and Simas 2012).

Second, voters may fear that they would "waste" their vote if the party they voted for did not eventually make it into parliament. Withholding a vote for a "risky" party on such grounds is subsumed in the literature under the category of strategic voting. Whereas non-strategic voters cast a vote for the party/candidate they choose on substantive grounds, irrespective of other considerations, strategic voters take into account the possible outcome of their voting decision (Abramson et al. 2010; Cox 1997).

When voting strategically, individuals will vote for a second-best party/candidate if their most preferred option is perceived as non-viable. Therefore, to act strategically, voters must have an assessment of a party's electoral viability. Lago (2008) argues that voters make such assessments based on history heuristics, whereby a party's viability depends on whether it has won seats in parliament in the past. As already mentioned, many PRRPs are new challenger parties that have not yet garnered sufficient electoral support to win a seat in parliament. Therefore, voting for these parties poses an electoral risk for voters, who fear they would "waste" their vote on a party that will not eventually make it into parliament.

Given the robust, well-documented gender gap in risk aversion, as well as the electoral risk PRRPs present in the eyes of voters, we hypothesize that risk aversion mediates the effect of gender on voting for PRRPs as follows:

> (H1) Risk-averse voters are less inclined to vote for PRRPs. As women are more risk-averse than men, they are less inclined to vote for PRRPs.

Next, we contend that the likelihood of voting for PRRPs depends not only on the degree of one's risk aversion but also on one's assessment of the risk associated with such a choice. While we do not directly measure the perceived risk of voting for a PRRP, we argue that this perception is affected by the electoral context in which voting decisions are made: A risky context will lead to a greater perceived risk among women since they are more sensitive than men to risky situations.

In the case in point, a risky electoral context involves PRRPs which have yet to win a seat in parliament. Voters may consider such PRRPs as riskier for the following two reasons: (a) they

are viewed as less predictable or less stable, and (b) they lack previous electoral success to build on or replicate in the ensuing elections.

As already stated, the literature on risk perception shows that women are more concerned than men about hazards and focus on the negative side of a risky situation's outcome distribution. That is, given the same objective conditions, women often perceive a situation as riskier than men do. As a result, we anticipate that, in a risky electoral context, gender will moderate the effect of risk aversion on vote choice, as women will be more sensitive to PRRPs' past electoral success:

> (H2) In risky electoral contexts, risk averse women are less likely to vote for PRRPs compared to risk averse men.

3.2 Political extremism – the social risk of voting for PRRPs

Voting for PRRPs can also be considered as a social risk, due to their usually extreme and radical platforms. As inherent challengers, PRRPs fundamentally defy key institutions and values of liberal democracy including minority rights and separation of powers (Mudde 2019). Such extreme ideological positions may deter voters who tend to conform with social norms. While the act of voting is private, voters incorporate social norms into their electoral decisions, which are in consequence affected by social cues and parties' reputation (Harteveld et al. 2019). Our theoretical argument, elaborated below, is that voting for a PRRP is associated with the risk of diverging from social conventions and prevailing opinions. Since women and men differ in risk-taking tendencies, the electoral consequences of such social risk will be different for each gender.

Emerging literature connects social personality traits with support for PRRPs. For instance, Bakker et al. (2016) show that a low score on Agreeableness, a trait that relates to higher levels of

prosocial behaviors, predicts voting for populist parties. Studies by Blinder, Ford and Ivarsflaten (2013) and by Harteveld and Ivarsflaten (2018) show that people who are highly motivated to control prejudice are less likely to support extreme right parties. The latter study highlights the implication of this finding for the gender gap in voting for PRRPs: Even when they hold stereotypic attitudes or beliefs, women are more inclined to control them based on socially driven norms anchored in anti-prejudice principles. Moreover, the social risk of voting for PRRPs is likely to be more salient for women, as they may incur harsher criticism than men when displaying rebellious or extreme behavior. Thus, Harteveld et al. (2019) show that women are less likely than men to vote for small, extreme, or socially stigmatized parties.

In parallel to the influence of electoral risk, we expect the effect of social risk on voting for PRRPs to be contingent on these parties' electoral status. Put simply, not all PRRPs are equally risky to vote for, socially-wise. In this article, we focus on PRRPs' reputation in terms of their previous electoral parliamentary experience. Thus, voting for PRRPs which have never gained parliamentary representation poses a greater social risk, since these parties do not bear a stamp of stability or acceptance (Valentim 2021). Following this rationale, we expect women's lower rate of support for PRRPs to be connected to their lower tendency to translate extreme political attitudes to political behavior, in case in point, voting for PRRPs. Like the previous hypothesis, this assumption rests on the premise that women perceive the social risk of voting for PRRPs in risky situations as greater than men. In such an electoral context, a man will be more likely to translate his extreme-right ideological position to voting for PRRPs than a woman who holds the same extreme position. We hypothesize that, in a risky electoral context, gender will moderate the effect of ideological extremism on vote choice:

(H3) In a risky electoral context, ideological extremism affects women's vote for PRRPs less strongly than men's.

4. Empirical strategy

4.1 Data and measurement

This study draws on three sources of data. At the individual level, we utilize all eight waves of the ESS between 2002 and 2016, with a total of 75 country-years. We also employ the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) data (modules 4 and 5) to analyze strategic voting in Germany. We supplement this data with macro-level variables tapping the changing electoral fortunes of PRRPs. In keeping with the idea that gender differences in political behavior are affected by culture, we limit our analyses to Western European countries. The countries and the populist radical right parties included in the analysis are presented in Table A1 in the Appendix (p.4).

4.1.1 The dependent variable

Vote choice: This variable was gauged using the question, "Which party did you vote for in the last election?"[2] Respondents' vote choices were sorted into party families (see Appendix B, p.8, for details on the sources we used to classify parties into families). We proceeded by focusing on the populist radical right. The dependent variable is a dummy variable, where 1 denotes respondents' vote for PRRPs and 0 otherwise.

[2] Social risk aversion might lead female respondents to falsely deny having voted for a PRRP – more so than men. Yet, other studies that used CAWI data, rather than personal interviews (e.g., Coffé 2019), still register a gender gap in voting for PRRPs.

4.1.2 Main predictors

PRRPs electoral strength and parliamentary history: To operationalize PRRPs' electoral strength, we employed the following three measures: (1) a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if these parties had ever entered parliament in the past; (2) PRRPs' vote share in the last national election preceding the survey; and (3) the share of seats in the national legislature, determined at the last national election preceding the survey. Measure 1 relates to Lago's (2008) argument regarding heuristics voters rely on, while measures 2 and 3 have been frequently used to capture strategic voting in studies focusing on far-right parties (Cohen 2020).

Risk aversion: Previous studies proved that a general item outperforms other measures in predicting risky behavior across a wide range of areas in life (Dohmen et al. 2011). Accordingly, as has been used extensively in political science (e.g., Margalit and Shayo 2020; Nadeau, Martin, and Blais 1999; Steenbergen and Siczek 2017), we measured individuals' risk aversion utilizing a single item. Participants were presented with a description of a person ("She/he looks for adventures and likes to take risks") and asked to indicate, on a scale of 1 to 6 to what extent the person described was like them, with higher values indicating higher risk aversion. Consistent with the literature on risk aversion, this item correlates with age and gender (partial r =0.31, partial r =-0.14, $p < 0.01$ for both).

Left-right self-placement: Individuals' ideological self-placement was measured on an 11-point self-placement ideology scale (0-left, 10-right).

4.1.3 Control variables

We controlled for a set of socio-demographic and attitudinal variables including age, gender, education, unemployment, and whether respondents are foreign-born. Additionally, we controlled for two indicators that are often mentioned as explanations for PRRP support: trust in politicians and political interest. Studies have shown that the rise of PRRPs in European democracies is associated with a growing public alienation from the political elites – a process that has frequently been manifested as protest votes against mainstream politicians and political parties (Inglehart and Norris 2017). The item gauging trust in politicians was rated on a scale ranging from 0 "no trust at all" to 10 "complete trust" (M=3.9; SD=2.3). Political interest was measured using the item "How would you assess your interest in politics?" rated on a 4-point scale (reverse-coded so that higher values denote greater interest in politics; M=2.5; SD=2.3).

Additionally, we included two anti-immigrant scales (economic and cultural anti-immigrant attitudes, respectively) created based on five items available from the ESS. These scales are described in detail in the Appendix (note to Figure C1, p.25). Consistent with the literature, the distribution of the two anti-immigrant scales for the two sexes emerged as similar, and no significant differences were documented between genders.

4.2 Models and estimation

The empirical analysis follows four trajectories. First, we establish descriptive differences in risk aversion and ideological self-placement between genders. This is followed by two sets of regression models. In the first set of models we (re)establish the gender gap in voting for PRRPs and show the relationship between risk aversion and vote. These models involved pooled data for both risky and non-risky contexts. The results informed the second set of models, which examined whether men and women behave differently in risky contexts. Accordingly, the second set of models comprises probit regressions to predict the probabilities for female and male respondents,

respectively, to choose PRRPs over other parties based on the former's past electoral achievements. These cross-level interaction models reveal a larger gender gap in risky contexts, indicating that the gender gap in the electoral support for PRRPs is rooted in risk-related attitudes and perceptions.

Third, we test the differential gendered effects of ideological extremism and risk aversion on vote choice. To that end, we interact risk aversion and ideological extremism with gender. The analyses are performed on both the pooled data and in contexts where voting for PRRPs is fraught with risk, in accordance with the second and third hypotheses, respectively. In light of our theoretical premises, we would expect that risk-averse and ideologically extremist female voters will refrain to a greater extent from supporting the radical right. Importantly, we would expect a larger differentiated effect in risky electoral contexts. The fourth trajectory situates the analysis in Germany, where the possibility of vote splitting provides a tool to distinguish between the electoral risk and social risk as explanatory mechanisms for the gender gap.

5. Results

5.1 Risk aversion, political extremism, and the vote for PRRPs

We begin with Figure 1, documenting descriptive differences in risk aversion and political extremity between women and men.[3] The left-hand panel shows differences between women's and men's self-perception in terms of seeking adventures and risks, with more men than women reporting high risk propensity. Women are 1.5 times more likely than men to indicate that the

[3] Figures C4 and C5 (pp.28-29) in the Appendix show that the above pattern holds in each of the countries included in the study.

description in the item described above is not at all like them (category 6). On this item, men score on average 3.7 (*SD*=1.38), while women – 4.1 (*SD*=1.4).

The right-hand panel shows that, compared to men, women have a lower tendency to hold extreme political attitudes. On average, more women than men locate themselves at the center of the left-right ideological dimension. As already explained, even for voters who are ideologically positioned at the extremes, we expect the social risk of voting for PRRPs to act as a deterrent, and especially so for those more sensitive to risk, i.e., women. Although we do not hypothesize about compositional differences in political extremity between genders, patterns documented in Figure 1 align with this social-risk perspective. Since women are socialized to conformity and to abiding by existing norms, they are more likely than men to position themselves at the center and less likely – at the extreme right.[4]

[Figure 1 about here]

Thus far, we have documented compositional gender differences, showing that men are on average positioned ideologically to the right of women and that they are more risk-tolerant. Next, to investigate the effect of risk aversion on the gender gap in voting for PRRPs, we estimate probit models, presented in Table 1. All models include respondents' demographic background and

[4] No gender gap was registered in the extreme left ideological spectrum. one explanation for this asymmetric gap is the fact that radical left in Western Europe is more established, and normalized than the radical right. Radical left parties are also less disliked by voters than populist radical right parties.

attitudinal variables, as well as country and year fixed effects (full models are presented in Table C1 in the Appendix, p.9).

Model 1, with only gender on the right-hand side, confirms the gender gap documented in the literature, such that men are overrepresented among the populist radical right electorate. Model 2 adds risk aversion. The negative and significant coefficient obtained shows that risk-averse voters are less prone to support the populist radical right. Although, in Model 2, the decline in the gender coefficient is small, the risk-averse voters' lower tendency to support the populist radical right (Model 2), combined with men's greater risk acceptance (Figure 1) results in a higher rate of support for the PRRPs among men compared to women. These results are consistent with H1.

[Table 1 about here]

5.2 The effect of a risky electoral context

We now factor in the effect of context, in order to examine whether the electoral behavior of women and men is different in the face of a risky electoral choice. Models 3-5 in Table 1 report the results of probit regression models predicting the vote for PRRPs as a function of these parties' past electoral and legislative success. Specifically, we report the effect of cross-level interactions between gender and a risky context on the vote. The negative coefficient of gender (male) interacted with past electoral success (see Figure C2, p.26, in the Appendix for a graphic presentation of this interaction) indicates that, as anticipated, women's vote is more affected by a risky electoral context than men's. As per Model 3, in cases where PRRPs entered parliament in the previous elections, the predicted probability for female voters to support PRRPs is more than

double compared to cases where PRRPs did not make it into parliament in the past. For men, no significant differences in the predictive probabilities to vote PRRPs were found between risky and not risky electoral contexts.

To corroborate the above findings, we investigated whether Green parties, which had also started out as challenger parties and in the 1980s were still relatively unknown, garnered more support from men than from women. Assessing the gender gap in the vote for these parties from the 1980s until 2016, we find that women refrained from voting for Green parties while these were new and therefore a risky choice. However, when these parties gained electoral success and established themselves in European party systems, women joined them at higher numbers than men. These findings, displayed in Figure C3 in the Appendix (p.27), are in line with our assumption that women are more risk-averse than men when it comes to vote choice.

What mechanisms account for the gender differences in *political behavior* in a risky electoral context observed in Models 3-5 in Table 1? Our second and third hypotheses suggest that compared to men, women perceive greater risk in an uncertain context and are less prone to translate extreme ideological positions to political behavior, in case in point, voting for PRRPs. Put differently, risk aversion and ideological extremism both have a differential effect on the vote of men and women, especially in a risky electoral context. Table 2 tests these hypotheses. Model 1 interacts gender with risk aversion and Model 3 interacts gender with ideological self-placement; thus, the parameters of risk aversion and ideological self-placement are each assigned a gender-specific coefficient. Models 2 and 4 are similar to Models 1 and 3, respectively, but are executed only on those cases in which voting for the radical right is a risky choice – specifically, where the vote share of PRRPs is lower or equal to the median vote share of these parties in the pooled data. Filtering the cases according to this criterion cuts the sample size by more than half, thereby

distilling the effect of the political context and yielding a more accurate estimation of the interaction terms. For robustness purposes, we reran our analysis on cases where PRRPs did not enter parliament in t-1 – thus splitting our sample elsewhere – and using a different measure for a risky context. The results were similar to the ones presented in Models 2 and 4 (Table C3, p.12, in the Appendix).

Comparing Models 1 and 3 (all cases) with Models 2 and 4 (risky context), respectively, reveals that the coefficients (for risk aversion/ideological extremism and the respective interaction terms with gender) are larger in Models 2 and 4, with a consequent higher statistical significance. Therefore, to substantively evaluate the effect of risk aversion and ideological self-placement on the vote, and in particular the differential effect in this regard between women and men, we calculated, for both genders, the predicted probability of voting for PRRPs based on Models 2 and 4 across different levels of risk aversion and ideological self-placement. Figures 2 and 3 present the results of this analysis.

[Table 2 about here]

Figure 2 displays predicted probabilities for women and men to vote for PRRPs as a function of their risk aversion. The black line represents women's and the grey line, men's predicted vote (95% confidence intervals in parentheses). The downward trending of the graphs for both men and women indicates that one's tendency to avoid risk decreases the likelihood of one's voting for PRRPs, as could be expected. For men, however, the differences between risk-averse and risk-accepting individuals are not statistically significant. For women, these differences are significant, indicating that, compared to risk-accepting women, risk-averse women tend to refrain more from voting for PRRPs.[5] The figure also demonstrates the differences in the effect risk aversion has on women's and men's likelihood to vote for PRRPs. The more we move toward the risk-averse side of the horizontal axis, the larger are the differences between men's and women's likelihood to vote for PRRPs. Put differently, risk-averse women are less likely to vote for PRRPs compared to risk-averse men. This shows that women's electoral behavior is sensitive to risky contexts, while men's is not. These findings attest to gender differences in the perception of risk whereby not only are women more risk-averse than men (Figure 1), but they may also tend to perceive realities as riskier than men and are therefore more reactive to a risky context in their vote. The results of the analysis support hypothesis H2.

[5] We reran a similar regression to that presented in Model 2 Table 2, but for non-risky context. Results show no statistically significant differences in the predicted probabilities to vote PRRPs between risk-averse and risk-taking female voters (see Figure C6, p.30, in the Appendix).

[Figure 2 about here]

Figure 3 displays the predicted probabilities of voting for PRRPs in risky electoral contexts across values of left-right self-placement, holding other variables at their respective means. As expected, as we move from left to right along the self-placement continuum, the probability of supporting PRRPs substantially increases: from about 1% for those who place themselves ideologically on the left to about 10% for those located on the extreme right. In all positions on the left-right ideological scale, women are less likely to support PRRPs compared to men. More importantly, the change in probability is of greater magnitude for men than for women, suggesting that, consistent with our expectation, the effect of extreme right ideological position on the vote is substantially larger among men than among women. Right-extremist men are twice as likely to vote for PRRPs than their female counterparts (10% and 5.2%, respectively). In other words, men position themselves on the extreme right more than women (see Figure 1), and their ideological positions translate more strongly to vote choice. We suggest that, in keeping with hypothesis H3, this is a good indication that women perceive the social risk of voting for PRRPs in risky situations as greater compared to men.

[Figure 3 about here]

To the extent that women are prone to avoid PRRPs, which parties do right-extremist women vote for? Table C4 (p.14) in the Appendix shows that extreme right-wing women tend to vote for conservative parties. In multinomial regression models, we compared respondents' propensity to vote PRRPs (reference category) versus other party families. Results of this estimation support the hypothesis that, compared to men, women are less likely to vote for PRRPs even when they are ideologically closest to these parties. This finding also corroborates our contention that, being socially risk-averse, women refrain from voting for PRRPs as their behavior is more reactive to party reputation and societal norms.

5.3 Robustness analysis

We reran our analysis with partly different empirical specifications. By and large, the results hold across almost all variations. The details are described below.

Model specification. The analysis in Table 1 was rerun using hierarchical logistic models (Table C5, p.15, in the Appendix). This analysis was also repeated using linear probability modeling. Results are similar to those reported for the main analysis.

Classification of PRRPs. A different classification of populist radical right parties was used in repeated analyses, based on Norris (2005) (see Appendix B, p.8, for the list of PRRPs included in each classification; see Tables C6 and C7, pp.16-17, in the Appendix for the analysis). Our results hold.

Additional control variables. Studies have shown that blue-collar workers and small business groups tend to vote for PRRPs (e.g., Ivarsflaten 2005). Accordingly, the analysis was repeated, controlling for occupational class (Table C8, p.18, of the Appendix). As PRRPs also advance anti-

feminist agendas and culturally conservative attitudes that might drive women away, we also controlled for these parties' ideological positions on the second dimension. The results are fully consistent with those obtained originally (Tables C9 and C10, pp.20-22, in the Appendix). Lastly, women might systematically disagree with PRRPs visions of illiberal democracy more than men, which may, in turn, affect the gender gap in the vote for these parties. In the main analysis, we control for trust in politicians, a proxy for the democratic dissatisfaction that is often seen as driving populist support. In the Appendix (Table C11, p.23), we also control for respondents' level of agreement with the item "Political parties that wish to overthrow democracy should be banned." Results are consistent with those reported in the main analysis.

Risky context. As part of the main investigation, the sample was split according to country-years in which the vote share of PRRPs is lower or equal to the median vote share, and the analysis was then repeated for this population, as per Models 2 and 4 in Table 2. These models were rerun using a different measure: country-years where PRRPs did not make it into parliament in t-1. The results, displayed in Table C3 (p.12) of the Appendix, are similar to, in fact, slightly stronger than the results reported in the main analysis, assuaging concerns over arbitrariness in choosing the cut-off point to delimit risky contexts.

5.4 Isolating electoral and social risk aversion: The German case

The analysis of the cross-national observational data presented above lends support to the two hypothesized mechanisms behind the gender gap in the vote for PRRPs, namely electoral risk and social risk. While the two causal sequences differ in micro-foundations, the above cross-sectional analysis cannot provide decisive evidence as to which mechanism is at work. Indeed, these two dynamics are not mutually exclusive: Women may be reluctant to vote for new populist right-wing

parties, or for parties that did not make it into parliament in the past, owing to either a behavioral proclivity to avoid electoral risks or to their tendency to conform to societal norms, or both.

To distill the effect of electoral risk, we leverage the case of Germany, which assists us in two ways. First, the German mixed-member proportional electoral system allows each voter two ballots, and therefore enables us to identify voters who made a socially risky choice by voting for a PRRP on one vote but refrained from doing so on the other. This minimizes the possible effect of a socially-driven risk aversion and foregrounds the electoral-risk mechanism. Second, we examine our argument comparing two German parties that present a similar degree of electoral risk: a PRRP (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) and a mainstream, centrist party (Freie Demokratische Partei, FDP). Similar results obtained for both parties will point to an electoral risk-aversion mechanism, which applies to electorally risky parties in general, not only PRRPs.

Background. The first tier in German elections is a district single-member, plurality vote, where a winning candidate amasses the most votes. A second, closed-list, proportional-representation tier affords a chance to gain representation in parliament even to small party-lists if they get more than 5% of all national-list votes. Because voters are incentivized to cast their first vote for a less favored but more competitive candidate, the large mainstream parties have historically dominated the first vote, while smaller parties have fared better in the second vote. In such a scenario, the degree of ticket-splitting between the two ballots provides a measure of strategic voting (Gschwend, 2007): The more one fears to waste one's (first) vote, the more likely one is to split tickets – voting strategically for a viable large-party candidate in the first vote and non-strategically for a party list in the second. Thus, to factor out the social-risk mechanism and

address only the one based on electoral risk, we focus on those voters who cast their second ballot for the radical right party. In expressing their commitment to this party through their second ballot, AfD voters have already overcome their apprehension of any social risk this choice may be fraught with. Therefore, refraining from casting one's first vote for a radical right party is likely motivated by an electoral risk aversion rather than by social risk aversion.

The 2013 and 2017 German federal elections constitute a particularly promising case for analysis, as not only the right-wing populist AfD but also the mainstream center-right FDP presented an electoral risk, which moreover varied in magnitude for both these parties from one election to the other. However, in this context, voting for the AfD would have been construed as socially risky, while voting for the FDP would not have involved any social risk.

In the 2013 elections, supporters of both AfD and FDP risked "wasting their votes." AfD had been founded only a few months previously, and based on polls, was projected to receive on average less than 3% of the vote in the next elections (Zicht and Wilko n.d.), well below the electoral threshold. While FDP was founded in 1948 and, from that time, was a member of each parliament and most cabinets up to 2013, it had arrived at the 2013 elections after suffering considerable losses in several subnational elections. In the six months before the elections, public opinion polls projected the FDP to receive, on average, 4.9% of the vote (Zicht and Wilko n.d.), just below the electoral threshold. Indeed, both parties eventually failed to gain seats in the 2013 Bundestag, falling short of the 5% national threshold.

The picture changed considerably in the run-up to the 2017 federal elections. In the preceding months, AfD had gained seats in 14 of the 16 German state parliaments. FDP had likewise regained its representation in most state parliaments between 2015 and 2017. In the six

months leading to the elections, both were projected to receive between 8% and 9% of the votes (Zicht and Wilko n.d.). Having a robust state-level standing and favorable polls, the two parties went on to (re)gain representation in the Bundestag, with 94 (AfD) and 80 (FDP) seats.

Analysis strategy and data. Utilizing the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) data from the relevant modules (4 and 5), we focused on voters who cast their second ballot for either the AfD or the FDP. We identified those who voted for either party with their second ballot in both 2013 and 2017 and measured the rate of ticket-splitting among those voters. That is, out of all AfD/FDP second-ballot supporters, we calculated the share of voters who split their vote (i.e., did not cast their first ballot for an AfD/FDP candidate), analyzing these ratios separately for men and women. Comparing 2013 with 2017, we first present the gender gaps in vote splitting across time. The second analysis is geographical: We pool the data for both elections, divide it by districts, and compare gendered ticket-splitting for each party between districts where its candidate received below-median electoral support in the first vote (6% for AfD and 4% for FDP) and districts where its candidate received above-median electoral support.

Results. We begin with a two-by-two comparison of the gender gap in ticket-splitting within each party between the 2013 and 2017 elections and between the AfD and FDP in each election. Figure 4 displays the results of this comparison. It shows that the share of ticket-splitting among AfD supporters (left panel) in the 2013 elections is more than twice that in 2017. This stands to reason as the AfD, an unknown commodity in 2013, swiftly gained electoral credibility in the run-up to the 2017 federal elections. Of even greater salience is the difference in the *gender gap* in AfD

ticket-splitting between the two elections. While in 2013, women split tickets more than men, in 2017, no such difference is discernible. The results for the FDP supporters (right panel) are striking, in that almost no difference in ticket-splitting emerges among men between 2013 and 2017. Women, on the other hand, split their vote more than men for the FDP candidate in 2013, when this party constituted an apparent electoral risk; in 2017, this gender gap disappears, as in the case of the AfD.

[Figure 4 about here]

The longitudinal comparison presented above is not causally definitive, as differences in voting may be driven by various processes. A pooled geographical comparison helps elucidate the picture. Figure 5 compares men's and women's ticket-splitting in districts with high and low support for the AfD and FDP candidates. It shows that, in a risky context (low support for the AfD or FDP candidate on the first vote at the district level), women refrain from casting their vote for these parties' candidates to a greater extent than men. This gender gap in ticket-splitting tapers off in districts where these parties' candidates stand a better chance of being elected. Thus, in the face of an ostensibly risky electoral choice, women were less likely than men to vote for the respective party's candidate, even when they cast their second vote for that party on the list. In districts where either AfD or FDP candidates were regarded as less electorally risky, the gap between women and men disappears.

The analysis of the German case demonstrates that the effect of a risky electoral context on the gender gap in voting holds for both an ideologically extreme right-wing party (AfD) and a

mainstream centrist party (FDP). As at issue are second ballots cast for these parties, it can be safely assumed that the voters' choice was unaffected by social risk aversion. Therefore, we can be as confident that their reticence to cast their first ballot for these parties' candidates was motivated by electoral risk aversion. The finding that, regarding both the AfD and the FDP, women tended more than men to split their vote in riskier electoral contexts supports our case for the existence of a gender-driven electoral-risk mechanism, not yet identified or described in the literature.

[Figure 5 about here]

6. Conclusion

This paper explores gendered voting patterns for the fastest growing party family in Europe – populist radical right parties (PRRPs). In light of cross-country and longitudinal differences in the electoral success of PRRPs, assessed based on their representation in parliament, we have shown that a key explanation for the gender gap in the vote for these parties is risk aversion.

This paper contributes to the burgeoning literature investigating the gender gap in voting for PRRPs. While studies show robust gender differences in the support for PRRPs, such disparities are not present in political attitudes highly relevant in voting for such parties, i.e., immigration and minority integration policies. Why, then, do fewer women than men vote for populist right parties? This paper proposes two explanations for this gap, both related to risk aversion. The first is electoral risk, as these parties are often new and unknown entities, and might not make it into parliament; consequently, risk-averse voters are apprehensive of either wasting their vote or the uncertainty regarding these parties' largely unpredictable policies. The second is

social risk: PRRPs usually champion extreme and radical causes. Such agendas lead risk-averse voters, wishing to abide by the social norms they have internalized, to direct their ballot elsewhere. We expect both these explanatory dynamics to have a greater effect on women than on men.

Both these lines of inquiry have been borne out. Findings indicate that women are less inclined to vote for PRRPs out of concern that their vote will be lost, and also because of the social risk involved in voting for parties that are considered extreme or non-conformist. Moreover, when the context of voting for PRRPs is construed as risky, women's electoral response is stronger than men's, indicating that, in such situations, women perceive the risk of voting for these parties as higher than men do. Conversely, men's vote for PRRPs is not affected by a risky context. By virtue of its design, targeting risky contexts, this study adduces suggestive evidence for the effect of risk perception on voting behavior. Future studies could bolster and nuance this case through experimental research. To demonstrate the salience and efficacy of the mechanism driven by electoral risk, we have examined the case of Germany, whose electoral system allows isolating such an effect. In Germany, we have found that strategic voting behavior among PRRP supporters presents a gender gap only in contexts involving an electoral risk. This pattern is manifest also among voters supporting a mainstream party.

This paper also taps into a larger debate on gender and populism that is currently unfolding in the literature. We join a growing body of research addressing as yet unresolved questions regarding the links between gender, populism and radical right parties and contribute to the literature that examines voting patterns for the radical right. In this regard, we have addressed not only the individual-level demand side, but also the party-level supply side and the interaction between these two domains. In combining individuals' characteristics and their gendered variation with contextual factors, this study accomplishes two objectives: First, it links the well-established

gender gap in support for PRRPs to a basic personality trait, risk-aversion; and second, it suggests two mechanisms that account for the different effect of a generalized, consistent gender disparity in risk propensity in different contexts. Thus, we propose a novel theory and adduce empirical evidence thereto, explaining why men and women differ substantially in supporting some parties at certain times, but much less so on other occasions and in different circumstances. Furthermore, our theoretical model yields a testable prediction: In parallel with similar trends, e.g., those documented for Green parties, as current PRRPs gain greater electoral success, we should expect a decline in the gender gap.

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Tables and Figures

Table 1. Support for populist radical right parties (Probit Models, 2002-2016)

	(1) Gender & controls	(2) Gender & Risk avoidance	(3) PRRP in parliament X gender	(4) Vote share X gender	(5) Seat share X gender
Male	0.21***	0.20***	0.29***	0.25***	0.24***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Risk avoider		-0.02***	-0.01*	-0.02***	-0.02***
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
RR in parliament $_{t-1}$			0.02		
			(0.07)		
M x in parliament $_{t-1}$			-0.13**		
			(0.05)		
RR vote share $_{t-1}$				3.96***	
				(0.19)	
M x vote-share $_{t-1}$				-0.30+	
				(0.16)	
RR seat-share $_{t-1}$					3.02***
					(0.17)
M x seat-share $_{t-1}$					-0.25*
					(0.13)
Controls	√	√	√	√	√
Country and year Fes	√	√	√	√	√
Constant	-3.06***	-3.02***	-3.49***	-3.87***	-3.67***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Observations	115084	115084	115084	115084	115084

Standard errors in parentheses; + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 2. Support for populist radical right parties (Probit Models, ESS 1-8), electoral and social risk

	Electoral risk		Social risk	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	All cases: Risk-averse interacted w/gender	Risky context: Risk-averse interacted w/gender	All cases: L-R scale interacted w/gender	Risky context: L-R scale interacted w/gender
Male	0.15***	0.07	0.08*	0.08
	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.04)	(0.08)
Risk averse	-0.01*	-0.07***	-0.01*	-0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.01)
M x risk-averse	0.01	0.04+		
	(0.01)	(0.02)		
L-R scale	0.13***	0.09***	0.12***	0.08***
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
M x L-R scale			0.01*	0.02+
			(0.01)	(0.01)
Country FE	√	√	√	√
Year FE	√	√	√	√
Controls	√	√	√	√
Constant	-3.47***	-2.41***	-3.43***	-3.23***
	(0.08)	(0.20)	(0.08)	(0.17)
Observations	115084	29668	115084	44132

Standard errors in parentheses; + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Figure 1. Distributions of risk-taking tendencies and L-R self-placement



Note. Left-hand panel presents the distribution of men and women on a general item of risk aversion; right-hand panel shows self-placement on the left-right scale broken down by gender. For both these distributions, the P-value of Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality $\leq$ 0.001.

Figure 2. Predicted probabilities to vote for PRRPs across levels of risk aversion



Note. Predicted probabilities to vote for PRRPs by gender across levels of risk aversion in risky contexts. Higher values on the horizontal axis represent a greater tendency to avoid risks. The analysis draws on Model 2 in Table 2.

Figure 3. Predicted probabilities to vote for PRRPs across levels of ideological self-placement



Note. Predicted probabilities to vote for populist radical right parties by gender across levels of ideological self-placement in a risky context. The analysis draws on Model 4 in Table 2. All other variables are kept at their respective means.

Figure 4. Ticket-splitting in the 2013 and 2017 federal elections in Germany



Note. Women's and men's ticket-splitting for the AfD (left) and FDP (right) in Germany in the 2013 and 2017 federal elections.

Figure 5. Ticket-splitting in high- and low-support districts in Germany



Note. Women's and men's strategic voting for the AfD (left) and FDP (right) in Germany in districts where these parties' candidates had won a low share of votes and in districts where this share had been high.

Supporting Information for

Risk aversion and the gender gap in the vote for populist radical right parties

Contents

Table A1. List of populist radical right parties by country and wave

	ESS 1 (2002)	ESS 2 (2004)	ESS 3 (2006)	ESS 4 (2008)	ESS 5 (2010)	ESS 6 (2012)	ESS7 (2014)	ESS8 (2016)
Austria	Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)	Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)	Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ)	N/A	N/A	N/A	Team Frank Stronach Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)	Team Frank Stronach Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)
Belgium	National Front Vlaams Blok	National Front Vlaams Blok	National Front Vlaams Belang	National Front Vlaams Belang	National Front Vlaams Belang People's Party	National Front Vlaams Belang People's Party	National Front Vlaams Belang People's Party	National Front Vlaams Belang People's Party

Switzerland	Swiss People's Party (SVP) Ticino League	Swiss People's Party (SVP) Ticino League	Swiss People's Party (SVP) Ticino League	Swiss People's Party (SVP) Ticino League	Swiss People's Party (SVP) Ticino League	Swiss People's Party (SVP) Geneva's Citizen's Movement (MCG)	Swiss People's Party (SVP) Geneva's Citizen's Movement (MCG) Ticino League	Swiss People's Party (SVP)
Germany	The Republicans	National Democratic Party of Germany The Republicans	National Democratic Party of Germany The Republicans	National Democratic Party of Germany The Republicans	National Democratic Party of Germany The Republicans	National Democratic Party of Germany The Republicans	National Democratic Party of Germany AfD	National Democratic Party of Germany AfD
Denmark	Danish People's Party (DPP)	Danish People's Party (DPP)	Danish People's Party (DPP)	Danish People's Party (DPP)	Danish People's Party (DPP)	Danish People's Party (DPP)	Danish People's Party (DPP)	N/A
Spain	N/A *	N/A *	N/A *	N/A *	N/A *	N/A *	N/A *	N/A *
Finland	True Finns	True Finns	True Finns	True Finns	True Finns	True Finns	True Finns	True Finns

						Freedom party		
France	National Front (FN) Mouvement National Républicain (MNR) Rassemblement du Peuple Français (RPF)	National Front (FN) Mouvement National Républicain (MNR) Rassemblement du Peuple Français (RPF)	National Front (FN) Mouvement National Républicain (MNR) Rassemblement du Peuple Français (RPF)	National Front (FN)	National Front (FN)	National Front (FN)	National Front (FN)	National Front (FN)
United Kingdom	N/A	N/A *	UKIP British National Party	N/A *	N/A *	N/A *	UKIP	UKIP
Greece	N/A*	Popular Orthodox Party (LAOS)	N/A	Popular Orthodox Party (LAOS)	Popular Orthodox Party (LAOS)	Golden Dawn	N/A	N/A
Ireland	N/A*	N/A*	N/A*	N/A*	N/A*	N/A*	N/A*	N/A*
Iceland	N/A	Liberal Party	N/A	N/A	N/A	Liberal Party	N/A	Progressive Party

		Progressive Party				Citizen's Movement		
Italy	National Alliance (AN) Lega Nord (LN)	National Alliance (AN) Lega Nord (LN)	N/A	N/A	N/A	Lega Nord (LN)	N/A	Lega Nord (LN)
Luxembourg	N/A *	N/A *	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Netherlands	Pim Fortuyn List (LPF) Christian Union	Pim Fortuyn List (LPF) Liveable Netherlands (LN)	Pim Fortuyn List (LPF) Liveable Netherlands (LN)	Pim Fortuyn List (LPF) Liveable Netherlands (LN) Freedom Party (PVV)	Freedom Party (PVV)	Freedom Party (PVV)	Freedom Party (PVV)	Freedom Party (PVV) Reformed Political Party
Norway	Progress Party (FrP)	Progress Party (FrP)	Progress Party (FrP)	Progress Party (FrP)	Progress Party (FRP)	Progress Party (FRP)	Progress Party (FRP)	Progress Party (FRP)
Portugal	N/A *	N/A *	N/A *	N/A *	N/A *	N/A *	N/A *	N/A *

Sweden	N/A *	N/A *	N/A *	N/A *	Sweden Democrats (SD)	Sweden Democrats (SD)	Sweden Democrats (SD)	Sweden Democrats (SD)

In red – parties classified by Norris as populist radical right parties but not by PopuList data. In back – parties classified as populist radical right by both Norris and PopuList.

N/A: Country not surveyed in round

N/A *: No radical right party

Appendix B. Party classifications

Political parties are sorted into party families according to several party classifications: (1) Comparative political data set, (2) Norris, Pippa (2005), (3) Laver, M., Gallagher, M., & Mair, P (2011), (4) The Parliament and Government Composition Database, (5) Mudde (2007), and (6) The Popuist databse (2011). In the analyses we employ two different categorizations of populist radical right parties, one that relies on Norris' classification and another that relies on the PopuList classification.

Each party is assigned a numeric code where the first digit indicates the superordinate family and the second digit represents a specific party family. For example, 81 = Ultra-right, 83 Radical right. The superordinate party family "radical right" is an aggregation of the parties that fall into the following categories: ultra-right, far right, radical right, neo-fascist populist, and protest parties.

The classifications are listed below.

1. Comparative Political Data Set. http://www.cpds-data.org/images/Update2015/CPDS_Codebook_1960-2013.pdf (p.45)
2. Norris, Pippa. 2005. *Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market*. Cambridge University Press pp. 54-57.
3. Laver, M., Gallagher, M., & Mair, P. (2011). *Representative Government in Modern Europe*. McGraw-Hill.
4. The Parliament and Government Composition Database (Parlgov), constructed by Döring, Manow and collaborators. http://www.parlgov.org.
5. Mudde, C. (2007). *Populist radical right parties in Europe* (Vol. 22, No. 8). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
6. The PopuList. https://popu-list.org/

Table C1. Support for populist radical right parties (Probit Models, ESS 1-8), Popu-List classification

	(1) Gender & controls	(2) Gender & Risk avoidance	(3) In parliament X gender	(4) VS X gender	(5) SS X gender
Male	0.21***	0.20***	0.29***	0.25***	0.24***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Risk avoider		-0.02***	-0.01*	-0.02***	-0.02***
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
RR in parliament $_{t-1}$			0.02		
			(0.07)		
M x in parliament $_{t-1}$			-0.13**		
			(0.05)		
RR vote share $_{t-1}$				3.96***	
				(0.19)	
M x vote-share $_{t-1}$				-0.30+	
				(0.16)	
RR seat-share $_{t-1}$					3.02***
					(0.17)
M x seat-share $_{t-1}$					-0.25*
					(0.13)
Education	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.03***	-0.02***	-0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age squared	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Unemployed for > 3 months	0.06***	0.06***	0.10***	0.06***	0.06***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Foreign born	-0.40***	-0.40***	-0.39***	-0.41***	-0.40***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Interest in politics	0.11***	0.11***	0.09***	0.11***	0.11***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Trust in politicians	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.07***	-0.06***	-0.06***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Cultural anti-immigrant attitudes	1.54***	1.54***	1.30***	1.57***	1.56***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Economic anti-immigrant	0.66***	0.66***	0.61***	0.67***	0.66***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Population density	-0.01+	-0.01+	-0.01	-0.01+	-0.01+
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-3.07***	-3.02***	-3.49***	-3.87***	-3.67***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Observations	115084	115084	115084	115084	115084

Robust standard errors in parentheses; + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Note. Models 1-2 are additive probit regressions; Models 3-5 present the results of the interaction of gender with risky political contexts. The dependent variable is dichotomous (1=vote for populist radical right party; 0=vote for other party). All models include country and year FEs. Results are consistent with past empirical studies on right-wing populist voting: the more educated respondents are, the less likely they are to vote for PRRPs; conversely, age, past unemployment and anti-immigrant attitudes are all positively associated with voting for populist radical right. The models likewise consistently predict that citizens with greater interest in politics are more likely to vote for PRRPs, while voters reporting high levels of trust in politicians tend to refrain from voting for these parties.

Table C2. Support for populist radical right parties (Probit Models, ESS 1-8), electoral and social risk

	Electoral risk		Social risk	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	All cases: Risk averse interacted w/gender	Risky context: Risk averse interacted w/gender	All cases: L-R scale interacted w/gender	Risky context: L-R scale interacted w/gender
Male	0.15***	0.07	0.08*	0.08
	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.04)	(0.08)
Risk averse	-0.01*	-0.07***	-0.01*	-0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.01)
M x risk-averse	0.01	0.04+		
	(0.01)	(0.02)		
L-R scale	0.13***	0.09***	0.12***	0.08***
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
M x L-R scale			0.01*	0.02+
			(0.01)	(0.01)
Education (yrs.)	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age	0.02***	0.01	0.02***	0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age squared	-0.00***	-0.00**	-0.00***	-0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Unemployed for > 3 months	0.10***	0.04	0.10***	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Foreign born	-0.39***	0.03	-0.38***	-0.19**
	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.06)
Interest in politics	0.09***	0.03	0.09***	0.06***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Trust in politicians	-0.07***	-0.10***	-0.07***	-0.09***
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Cultural anti-immigrant attitudes	1.30***	1.08***	1.30***	1.13***
	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.05)	(0.11)
Economic anti-immigrant attitudes	0.61***	0.60***	0.61***	0.51***
	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.05)	(0.10)
Population density	-0.00	0.03+	-0.00	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-3.47***	-2.41***	-3.43***	-3.23***
	(0.08)	(0.20)	(0.08)	(0.17)
Observations	115084	29668	115084	44132

Robust standard errors in parentheses; $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. Models 1 and 3 present the result of the interaction of risk propensity and ideological extremism with gender. Models 2 and 4 replicate the results of models 1 and 3 only in cases where voting for radical right is a risky political behavior.

Table C3. Support for populist radical right parties in risky electoral contexts (parties who did not enter parliament in t-1, Probit Models, ESS 1-8)

	Risk propensity Risky context: Risk avoider interacted w/gender	Ideological extremism Risky context: L-R scale interacted w/gender
Male	-0.01	0.09
	(0.13)	(0.09)
Risk avoider	-0.08**	
	(0.02)	
M x risk avoider	0.06+	
	(0.03)	
L-R scale	0.12***	0.09***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
M x L-R scale		0.03*
		(0.01)
Education (yrs.)	-0.03**	-0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.00)
Age	0.02**	0.01*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age squared	-0.00***	-0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Unemployed for > 3 months	0.04	0.08*
	(0.05)	(0.03)
Foreign born	-0.08	0.02
	(0.11)	(0.07)
Interest in politics	-0.06*	-0.04*
	(0.03)	(0.02)
Trust in politicians	-0.10***	-0.10***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Cultural anti-immigrant attitudes	1.20***	1.33***
	(0.18)	(0.12)
Economic anti-immigrant attitudes	0.63**	0.58***
	(0.17)	(0.11)
Population density	0.06*	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Constant	-2.56***	-2.74***
	(0.28)	(0.20)
Observations	14009	24356

Standard errors in parentheses; + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table C4. Support for populist radical right parties as a function of ideological extremism (Multinomial logistic regression, ESS 1-8)

	(1) Radical Left	(2) Left & Greens	(3) Left	(4) Christian Dem	(5) Conservatives
Male	0.52***	-0.01	0.17	-0.24*	0.13
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.14)
L-R self-placement	-1.17***	-0.64***	-0.75***	-0.14***	0.32***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Male x L-R self-placement	-0.18***	-0.14***	-0.10***	-0.05**	-0.07***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
PRRPs vote share $_{t-1}$	-12.10***	-8.82***	-8.80***	-7.61***	-7.50***
	(0.70)	(0.49)	(0.40)	(0.45)	(0.45)
Education (yrs.)	0.04***	0.12***	0.02***	0.07***	0.09***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age	0.01	0.01*	0.02***	-0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age squared	-0.00	-0.00**	-0.00	0.00***	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Unemployed for > 3 months	0.02	-0.09*	-0.15***	-0.41***	-0.39***
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Foreign born	0.22*	0.05	0.37***	-0.11	-0.03
	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Interest in politics	0.03	-0.07***	-0.08***	-0.03	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Trust in politicians	0.06***	0.11***	0.18***	0.26***	0.17***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Cultural anti-immigrant attitudes	-3.38***	-4.56***	-2.97***	-2.18***	-3.14***
	(0.24)	(0.19)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.16)
Economic anti-immigrant attitudes	-1.84***	-2.28***	-1.45***	-1.71***	-1.08***
	(0.22)	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Population density	0.14***	0.20***	0.10***	-0.15***	0.08***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	5.64***	6.88***	7.74***	4.94***	-20.82
	(0.40)	(0.28)	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.00)
Observations	64,405	64,405	64,405	64,405	64,405
Country and Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Note. Table C4 reports results of multinomial regressions with clustered standard errors and dummies for country and ESS rounds. Dependent variable is vote (party families) with a reference category vote for populist radical right party.

Table C5. Support for populist radical right parties (Hierarchical Logit Models, ESS 1-8)

	(1) Gender & controls	(2) Gender & Risk avoidance	(3) VS X gender	(4) SS X gender	(5) In parliament X gender
Male	0.41***	0.40***	0.52***	0.50***	0.63***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.10)
Risk avoider		-0.03***			
		(0.01)			
RR vote share $_{t-1}$			9.84***		
			(1.16)		
RR seat share $_{t-1}$				7.81***	
				(0.96)	
RR in parliament $_{t-1}$					1.25***
					(0.38)
M x vote-share $_{t-1}$			-0.66**		
			(0.34)		
M x seat share $_{t-1}$				-0.58**	
				(0.27)	
M x in parliament $_{t-1}$					-0.24**
					(0.10)
Education (yrs.)	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age squared	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Unemployed for > 3 months	0.12***	0.12***	0.12***	0.12***	0.11***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Foreign born	-0.86***	-0.86***	-0.86***	-0.86***	-0.84***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Interest in politics	0.24***	0.23***	0.24***	0.24***	0.24***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Trust in politicians	-0.11***	-0.11***	-0.11***	-0.11***	-0.10***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Cultural anti-immigrant attitudes	3.07***	3.07***	3.06***	3.06***	3.08***
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Economic anti-immigrant attitudes	1.29***	1.31***	1.30***	1.29***	1.24***
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Population density	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-5.81***	-6.06***	-7.07***	-6.72***	-6.83***
	(0.19)	(0.34)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.38)
N individuals	115936	115084	115936	115936	115936
N country-years	75	75	75	75	75
Log likelihood	-23086	-22779	-23060	-23061	-23638
AIC	46198.6	45623.8	46149.5	46152.5	47306.2
BIC	46324.2	45942.3	46294.5	46297.4	47451.1

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table C6. Support for populist radical right parties (Probit Models, ESS 1-8), Norris' classification

	(1) Gender & controls	(2) Gender & Risk avoidance	(3) VS interacted w/gender	(4) SS interacted w/gender	(5) In parliament interacted w/gender
Male	0.20***	0.20***	0.21***	0.20***	0.25***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Risk avoider		-0.01**			
		(0.00)			
RR vote share $_{t-1}$			4.36***		
			(0.18)		
RR seat share $_{t-1}$				3.34***	
				(0.16)	
RR in parliament $_{t-1}$					0.24***
					(0.06)
M x vote-share $_{t-1}$			-0.29+		
			(0.15)		
M x seat share $_{t-1}$				-0.27*	
				(0.12)	
M x in parliament $_{t-1}$					-0.10*
					(0.04)
Education(yrs.)	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age squared	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Unemployed for > 3 months	0.05***	0.06***	0.10***	0.09***	0.09***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Foreign born	-0.38***	-0.38***	-0.37***	-0.37***	-0.37***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Interest in politics	0.11***	0.11***	0.08***	0.08***	0.09***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Trust in politicians	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.06***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Cultural anti-immigrant attitudes	1.51***	1.53***	1.31***	1.30***	1.29***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Economic anti-immigrant attitudes	0.60***	0.61***	0.57***	0.56***	0.56***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Population density	-0.02**	-0.02**	-0.01*	-0.01*	-0.01*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-2.93***	-2.93***	-4.33***	-4.12***	-4.12***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Observations	131800	130948	130948	130948	130948

Standard errors in parentheses; + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table C7. Support for populist radical right parties (Probit Models, ESS 1-8), electoral and social risk Norris' classification

	Electoral risk		Social risk	
	(1) All cases: Risk averse interacted w/gender	(2) Risky context: Risk averse interacted w/gender	(3) All cases: L-R scale interacted w/gender	(4) Risky context: L-R scale interacted w/gender
Male	0.14***	0.05	0.07+	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.07)
Risk avoider	-0.01*	-0.05***	-0.01*	-0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
M x risk avoider	0.01	0.04+		
	(0.01)	(0.02)		
L-R scale	0.13***	0.10***	0.12***	0.08***
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
M x L-R scale			0.02*	0.03*
			(0.01)	(0.01)
Education (yrs.)	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age squared	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Ever Unemployed for > 3 months	0.09***	0.07*	0.09***	0.07*
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Foreign born	-0.04	0.03	-0.03	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.07)
Interest in politics	0.09***	0.07***	0.09***	0.06***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Trust in politicians	-0.06***	-0.07***	-0.06***	-0.07***
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Cultural anti-immigrant attitudes	1.29***	1.05***	1.28***	1.11***
	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.05)	(0.10)
Economic anti-immigrant attitudes	0.56***	0.46***	0.56***	0.46***
	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.09)
Population density	-0.01*	-0.01	-0.01*	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Country FE	√	√	√	√
Year FE	√	√	√	√
Constant	-3.38***	-3.18***	-3.34***	-3.22***
	(0.08)	(0.16)	(0.08)	(0.15)
Observations	130948	49902	130948	59996

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table C8. Support for populist radical right parties, PopuList classification controlling for occupational class

	(1) Gender & controls	(2) Gender & Risk avoidance	(3) VS interacted w/gender	(4) SS interacted w/gender	(5) In parliament interacted w/gender
Male	0.22***	0.21***	0.25***	0.24***	0.58***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.13)
Risk avoider		-0.03***	-0.02**	-0.02**	-0.02**
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
RR vote share $_{t-1}$			2.98***		
			(0.28)		
RR seat share $_{t-1}$				2.62***	
				(0.26)	
RR in parliament $_{t-1}$					0.29*
					(0.14)
M x vote-share $_{t-1}$			-0.42+		
			(0.22)		
M x seat share $_{t-1}$				-0.39*	
				(0.20)	
M x in parliament $_{t-1}$					-0.41**
					(0.13)
Education(yrs.)	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age	0.01***	0.01***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age squared	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Unemployed for > 3 months	0.06**	0.06**	0.10***	0.10***	0.10***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Foreign born	-0.45***	-0.45***	-0.44***	-0.44***	-0.43***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Interest in politics	0.11***	0.10***	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Trust in politicians	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.06***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Cultural anti-immigrant attitudes	1.51***	1.51***	1.25***	1.25***	1.23***
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Economic anti-immigrant attitudes	0.65***	0.67***	0.61***	0.61***	0.62***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Population density	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Lower-grade service class (ref: higher-grade service)	0.12***	0.13***	0.15***	0.14***	0.15***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Small business owners (ref: higher-grade service)	0.22***	0.21***	0.18***	0.17***	0.18***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Skilled workers (ref: higher-grade service)	0.24***	0.24***	0.29***	0.29***	0.30***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Unskilled workers (ref: higher-	0.23***	0.24***	0.30***	0.29***	0.30***

grade service)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Country FE	√	√	√	√	√
Year FE	√	√	√	√	√
Constant	-3.44***	-3.36***	-4.69***	-4.62***	-4.32***
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.19)
Observations	60015	59355	59355	59355	59355

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table C9. Support for populist radical right parties
(controlling for economic and cultural positions of PRRPs, Hierarchical logit models, ESS 1-8)

	(1) Gender & controls	(2) Gender & Risk avoidance	(6) VS x gender	(7) SS x gender	(8) In parliament x gender
Male	0.40***	0.38***	0.51***	0.49***	0.75***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.15)
Risk avoider		-0.04***			
		(0.01)			
RR vote share $_{t-1}$			7.84***		
			(1.45)		
RR seat share $_{t-1}$				5.70***	
				(1.14)	
RR in parliament $_{t-1}$					0.41
					(0.51)
M x vote-share $_{t-1}$			-0.80		
			(0.50)		
M x seat share $_{t-1}$				-0.74**	
				(0.37)	
M x in parliament $_{t-1}$					-0.38**
					(0.16)
Cultural position of PRRPs	-0.17	0.09	-0.23**	-0.14	-0.15
	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.11)
Economic position of PRRPs	-0.07	-0.04	-0.11	-0.08	-0.08
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)
Education (yrs.)	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age squared	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Unemployed for > 3 months	0.15***	0.16***	0.16***	0.16***	0.13***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Foreign born	-0.82***	-0.83***	-0.83***	-0.83***	-0.80***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Interest in politics	0.20***	0.19***	0.20***	0.20***	0.20***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Trust in politicians	-0.11***	-0.12***	-0.11***	-0.11***	-0.11***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Cultural anti-immigrant attitudes	3.11***	3.12***	3.10***	3.11***	3.12***
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Economic anti-immigrant attitudes	1.37***	1.40***	1.37***	1.37***	1.29***
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Population density	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-3.96***	-6.36***	-4.16***	-4.77***	-4.37***
	(1.14)	(1.50)	(0.93)	(0.97)	(1.31)
N individuals	81288	80461	81288	81288	81288
N country-years	54	54	54	54	54
Log likelihood	-15920	-15432	-15908	-15908	-16402

AIC	31870.2	30931.8	31849.2	31850.5	32837.4
BIC	32010.0	31247.7	32007.7	32009.0	32995.9

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table C10. Support for populist radical right parties (Probit Models, ESS 1-8), electoral and social risk, controlling for economic and cultural position of PRRPs

	Electoral risk		Social risk	
	(2) All cases: Risk averse interacted w/gender	(3) Risky context: Risk averse interacted w/gender	(3) All cases: L-R scale interacted w/gender	(4) Risky context: L-R scale interacted w/gender
Male	0.14**	0.01	0.10*	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.09)
Risk avoider	-0.02*	-0.06***	-0.02**	-0.04**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
M x risk avoider	0.01	0.04+		
	(0.01)	(0.02)		
L-R scale	0.11***	0.11***	0.11***	0.09***
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
M x L-R scale			0.01	0.03*
			(0.01)	(0.01)
Education (yrs.)	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Age	0.02***	0.03***	0.02***	0.04***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Age squared	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Ever Unemployed for > 3 months	0.11***	0.10**	0.11***	0.04
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Foreign born	-0.36***	-0.23**	-0.36***	-0.20**
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.07)
Interest in politics	0.07***	0.07***	0.07***	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Trust in politicians	-0.07***	-0.09***	-0.07***	-0.07***
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Cultural anti-immigrant attitudes	1.38**	1.16***	1.37***	1.39***
	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.07)	(0.14)
Economic anti-immigrant attitudes	0.64***	0.77***	0.64***	0.57***
	(0.06)	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.12)
Population density	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Cultural position of PRRPs	-0.00	0.35***	-0.00	-0.61***
	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.10)
Economic position of PRRPs	-0.02	-0.09+	-0.02	-1.28***
	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.21)
Country FE	√	√	√	√
Year FE	√	√	√	√
Constant	-3.17***	-6.24***	-3.14***	9.94***
	(0.20)	(0.54)	(0.20)	(2.01)
Observations	80461	30195	80461	21016

Standard errors in parentheses; + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table C11. Support for populist radical right parties (Probit Models, ESS 1-8), PopuList classification, controlling for democratic attitudes

	(1) All cases: Risk averse interacted w/gender	(2) Risky context: Risk averse interacted w/gender	(3) All cases: L-R scale interacted w/gender	(4) Risky context: L-R scale interacted w/gender
Male	0.11*	-0.01	0.07	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.12)
Risk averse	-0.03**	-0.06**	-0.02**	-0.03+
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
M x risk averse	0.02	0.05+		
	(0.01)	(0.03)		
L-R scale	0.15***	0.12***	0.14***	0.10***
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
M x L-R scale			0.02+	0.03
			(0.01)	(0.02)
Education (yrs.)	-0.03***	-0.02**	-0.03***	-0.02**
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Age	0.02***	0.04***	0.02***	0.04***
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Age squared	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Unemployed for > 3 months	0.12***	0.00	0.12***	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.05)
Foreign born	-0.39***	-0.27**	-0.38***	-0.26**
	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.04)	(0.10)
Interest in politics	0.07***	0.01	0.07***	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Trust in politicians	-0.06***	-0.09***	-0.06***	-0.09***
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Cultural anti-immigrant attitudes	1.29***	1.15***	1.29***	1.14***
	(0.08)	(0.17)	(0.08)	(0.17)
Economic anti-immigrant attitudes	0.63***	0.59***	0.62***	0.58***
	(0.07)	(0.16)	(0.07)	(0.16)
Population density	0.00	0.03*	0.00	0.04*
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Ban political parties that wish overthrow democracy	0.05***	0.05**	0.05***	0.05**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Constant	-3.78***	-3.52***	-3.76***	-3.56***
	(0.11)	(0.25)	(0.11)	(0.25)
Observations	64936	18028	64936	18028

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table C12. Support for populist radical right parties (Probit Models, ESS 1-8), only voters

	(1) Gender & controls	(2) Gender & Risk avoidance	(3) VS X gender	(4) SS X gender	(5) In parliament X gender
Male	0.24***	0.23***	0.29***	0.28***	0.32***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.05)
Risk avoider		-0.03***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
RR vote share $_{t-1}$			4.44***		
			(0.20)		
M x vote-share $_{t-1}$			-0.48**		
			(0.18)		
RR seat-share $_{t-1}$				3.48***	
				(0.18)	
M x seat-share $_{t-1}$				-0.43*	
				(0.14)	
RR in parliament $_{t-1}$					0.03
					(0.07)
M x in parliament $_{t-1}$					-0.13**
					(0.05)
Education (yrs.)	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age squared	-0.00+	-0.00*	-0.00*	-0.00*	-0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Unemployed for > 3 months	0.10***	0.10***	0.14***	0.14***	0.14***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Foreign born	-0.08*	-0.08*	-0.06+	-0.06	-0.06
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Interest in politics	0.03***	0.03***	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Trust in politicians	-0.07***	-0.07***	-0.09***	-0.09***	-0.09***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Cultural anti-immigrant attitudes	1.67***	1.67***	1.45***	1.44***	1.42***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Economic anti-immigrant attitudes	0.74***	0.74***	0.70***	0.69***	0.68***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Population density	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-2.13***	-2.05***	-3.44***	-3.24***	-2.52***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.11)
Observations	90918	90918	90918	90918	90918

Standard errors in parentheses; $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. Respondents are those who reported to have vote in the previous elections.

Figure C1. Anti-immigrant attitudes by gender



Note. The figure shows the distribution of two anti-immigrant scales by gender. The scale are created based on five items available from the ESS: (i) agreement/disagreement that immigrants undermine the country's cultural life, (ii) support for allowing into the country immigrants of a race different from that country's majority, (iii) agreement/disagreement that immigrants make the country a worse place to live in, (iv) support for allowing into the country immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe, and (v) agreement/disagreement that immigrants are bad for the country's economy. The first three items, which tap cultural anti-immigrant attitudes, emerged as highly correlated ($\alpha = .8$), as did also the last two items ($\alpha = .64$), which tap economic motivations for anti-immigrant attitudes. We thus created two scales by averaging the three former and the two latter items to a cultural and an economic anti-immigrant scale, respectively. These measures vary between 0 and 1 (higher values denoting stronger anti-immigrant sentiments). Figure C1 shows that men hold less anti-immigrant economic attitudes than women (left-hand panel, differences are significant at the .01 level). No significant differences between the sexes were found in the anti-immigrant cultural scale distribution.

Figure C2. Predicted probabilities for female and male voters to support the radical right



*Note***.** Predicted probabilities for female and male voters to support the populist radical right in contexts where they had not gained seats in the previous elections and in contexts where they had. The probabilities are calculated off the results reported in Model 3 in Table 1 such that all other variables are held constant at their mean value. The predicted probability for women to vote for PRRPs is twice as large in scenarios where the radical right had gained at least one parliamentary seat in the past compared with those cases where it had not. It follows that, given that they perceive situations as riskier than men, women are more inclined to vote PRRPs when they perceive the electoral context as less risky. For men, no significant differences in the probability of voting for PRRPs have emerged between the two contexts. The above analysis provides an initial indication as to the mechanism underlying different vote choice by women and men.

Figure C3: Gender gap for Green parties, 1970-2016



*Note***.** The gender gap is calculated by subtracting women's vote-shares for the Green party family from those of men, such that a positive gap implies that men support this party more than women. On the horizontal axis is time, covering 32 years surveyed by the Eurobarometer and 14 additional years surveyed by the ESS. The figure presents a gender gap fluctuating between positive 5% until the mid-1980s and negative 10% in the early 2000s, with a steady and fixed negative gap into the latter periods surveyed. Figure C3 establishes the stylized fact that women are consistently more likely to support Green parties than men, but it also shows that, when Green parties were new players, women tended to refrain from voting for them relative to men.

Figure C4. Placement on left-right scale broken down by gender and country



Figure C4. Placement on left-right scale broken down by gender and country. Data: ESS 2002-2016

Note. While Figure 2 summarizes ideological gender gaps across all countries, some interesting between-country variation emerges with respect to the gender gap in political ideology. Figure A3 presents the results for each country. First, except for Luxembourg, all countries present a gender gap in identifying with the center, with women more so than men. Most countries display a gender gap at the right side of the scale, with women less likely to identify as rightwing compared to men. This gender gap at the right-side of the ideological spectrum is especially pronounced in Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Island, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. On the flipside, in some countries, women are more likely than men to identify with the left side of the scale (Denmark, Island and Norway). Only Luxembourg presents an exceptional pattern in the ideological gender gap whereby women are more right-wing than men and men are slightly more left-wing than women. Note, however, that Luxembourg has no radical right populist party.

Figure C5. Distribution of men and women on a general item of risk propensity broken down by gender and country



Note. The item wordings is: "Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person described is or is not like you. She/he looks for adventures and likes to take risks. The answer categories: 1 "very much like me" and 6 "not like me at all". Data: ESS 2002-2016.

Figure C6. Predicted probabilities to vote for PRRPs across levels of risk aversion in non-risky contexts



Note. Higher values on the horizontal axis represent a greater tendency to avoid risks. Results show no statistically significant differences in the predicted probabilities to vote PRRPs between risk-averse and risk-taking female voters.